Photo by Aubrey Odom on Unsplash

There’s something that happens in a conversation when someone changes their position in response to a good argument, something that should feel like intellectual honesty but often reads, in the room, as weakness. The person who held the original position is now the person who didn’t hold it firmly enough, who was persuaded, who moved, and in a culture that treats consistency with conviction as a virtue almost regardless of what the conviction is about, moving tends not to look particularly good.

The Stoics thought this was exactly backwards, and they were direct enough about it to be worth listening to.

What Rationality Actually Requires

Marcus Aurelius wrote about the willingness to be corrected as one of the marks of a rational man, and he meant it as a high compliment rather than a consolation. The man who can hear a better argument and update his position accordingly is, in his view, doing something that requires both intelligence and a particular kind of courage, the courage to let go of a position that is no longer defensible without needing the letting go to be invisible or painless.

This is harder than it sounds, and Marcus Aurelius knew it was harder than it sounds, which is probably why he wrote about it more than once. The ego has a strong interest in consistency, in the story that the positions you hold are the positions you’ve always held because they’re correct, rather than the positions you arrived at through a process that was, like most human processes, imperfect and open to revision. Admitting that a position needs revision involves admitting that the previous position was wrong, and admitting you were wrong is something most people find uncomfortable regardless of how reasonable it is in principle.

Why We Treat Consistency as a Virtue

The attachment to consistency has some real roots that are worth acknowledging before examining where it goes wrong. A person who changes their position frequently and without clear reason is difficult to trust, because their positions don’t provide reliable information about how they’ll act, and reliability is a real and important quality in a person. The suspicion of the person who changes their mind too easily is not entirely irrational.

But the suspicion has extended well beyond its useful range, to the point where any change of position, however well reasoned and however clearly prompted by new information or better argument, carries a faint suggestion of unreliability or weakness that the original position, however poorly reasoned, does not. The man who holds a bad position with great consistency is treated as more dependable than the man who held a position, encountered a better argument, and updated accordingly, which is a rather strange way to allocate trust.

Epictetus was clear about the distinction between changing your mind because you’ve been shown something better and changing it because you’ve been pressured or flattered or have simply lost the will to defend your original view. The first is rational and admirable. The second is a failure of character. The problem is that both look, from the outside, like the same thing, which is someone who no longer holds the position they previously held, and the culture tends to treat them as equivalent when they’re actually quite different.

The Stoic Position on Being Wrong

The Stoics were interested in truth in a way that made being wrong something to be corrected rather than something to be ashamed of, which is a subtle but important distinction. Shame about being wrong tends to produce defensiveness, the unwillingness to acknowledge error because acknowledgement feels like exposure, and defensiveness tends to extend the period of being wrong considerably beyond the point at which the evidence for being wrong became clear.

Seneca wrote about the man who clings to a position he knows is untenable, not because he’s convinced by it but because abandoning it would require him to admit he was wrong, and described this as a form of pride that costs considerably more than it protects. The position he’s defending may be small. The cost of defending it, in terms of the thinking he can no longer do honestly and the respect he loses from people who can see what’s happening, tends to be larger.

The alternative, simply acknowledging that you were wrong and updating your view, tends to cost less than expected and produce more goodwill than anticipated, because most people find intellectual honesty considerably more appealing than the performance of consistency, even if the culture doesn’t always make this clear.

What It Takes to Actually Do It

The willingness to change your mind in practice, rather than simply in principle, requires a few things that are worth naming because naming them makes them more available.

It requires having separated your sense of yourself from the positions you hold, so that a position being wrong doesn’t feel like you being wrong in any broader or more damaging sense. This is the core of what Marcus Aurelius was describing, a man whose self worth is not contingent on the correctness of his previous positions is free to update those positions when the evidence calls for it, because the update doesn’t cost him anything that actually matters.

It requires listening, in the sense of actually processing what the other person is saying rather than waiting for the gap in which to restate your own position, because you can’t be persuaded by an argument you haven’t actually heard, and most people hear considerably less of what’s being said to them than they believe they do.

And it requires a commitment to being right rather than to having been right, which sounds like the same thing but isn’t, because one is oriented towards the truth as it currently stands and the other is oriented towards the defence of a past judgement, and these two orientations produce very different conversations and very different outcomes.

The Relief of It

There’s something worth mentioning that doesn’t often come up in conversations about intellectual honesty, which is that changing your mind when the evidence calls for it tends to feel considerably better than the alternative, once the initial discomfort of the moment has passed.

Defending a position you no longer believe, or that you believe less firmly than you’re presenting, is a form of low level dishonesty that has its own particular exhaustion attached to it. The man who is honest about having updated his view, who can say clearly that he thought one thing and now thinks another and here is why, tends to feel lighter after the conversation than before it, rather than the reverse.

Seneca wrote about the freedom that comes from honesty in all its forms, and this is one of its less celebrated forms, the freedom from the maintenance of a position you’ve privately moved on from, from the performance of a consistency that no longer reflects what you actually think.

What This Looks Like in Practice

It looks like saying, when a better argument arrives, that’s a better argument than the one I had, and meaning it without qualification, without the subtle undermining of the concession that so often accompanies it, the but of course my original point still stands that turns the acknowledgement of a better argument into a defence of the original position by another route.

It looks like updating your view publicly when you’ve updated it privately, rather than maintaining the public position while quietly abandoning it, which is a form of dishonesty that tends to be noticed even when it isn’t named.

And it looks like treating the people who change your mind not as adversaries who have defeated you but as people who have done you a service, which is what Marcus Aurelius recommended and what, if you think about it clearly, they actually have.

The permission to change your mind is not something anyone else can give you, which is perhaps why it gets called permission rather than simply the right thing to do. It has to come from a clear enough sense of what you’re actually after, which is being right rather than having been right, and a secure enough relationship with yourself that the two can be distinguished without too much difficulty.

Once that’s in place, the changing tends to take care of itself.

Leave a Reply